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ABSTRACT 
The most effective and fastest-evolving delivery system for cocaine to move from 
its place of production in Colombia to the United States market has undoubtedly become 
the Self-Propelled Semi-Submersible (SPSS). Often called ―drug subs‖ or ―narco 
submarines,‖ SPSSs are used to transport cocaine from Colombia‘s Pacific coast into 
Central America and Mexico, then overland to the United States.  This thesis begins with 
an examination of the evolution of the illegal narcotics trade in Colombia since the 
1990s.  It examines the actions of United States government (USG) and Government of 
Colombia (GOC) to counter the production and transportation of illegal drugs through 
fumigation, manual eradication, air-bridge denial and maritime interdiction strategies.   
The success of these strategies has caused Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) to 
develop and launch SPSSs, and now self-propelled fully submersibles (SPFSs). The 
increasing sophistication and range of the SPSS/SPFS have given rise to at least two 
fears: first, that cocaine may be transported straight onto U.S. shores by boats that are 
practically impossible to detect.  Second, that a terrorist group will use SPSS/SPFS to 
transport Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) into the United States and other 
nations.   
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I. INTRODUCTION:  THE STEALTH SMUGGLER 
A.  EVOLUTION OF DRUG TRADE FROM PERU TO COLOMBIA  
For decades, Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) have posed a threat to the 
governments of Colombia and the United States, as well as the general region of Latin 
America.  Proceeds from drug trafficking continue to finance insurgent groups and 
criminal cartels, whose violence and corruption undermine government legitimacy and 
threaten social stability. Counterstrategies attack the DTOs directly through law 
enforcement and military operations that seek to dismantle criminal structures, kill, 
incarcerate or demobilize their membership, dry up their finances, eradicate coca 
production and processing, and sever the supply routes. This thesis focuses on the final 
dimension—in particular on the use since the 1990s—of Self-Propelled Semi-
Submersibles (SPSSs) to transport cocaine from Colombia north toward the lucrative 
U.S. market.   
As a technological concept, SPSSs date at least from the sixteenth century when 
English mathematician William Bourne patented his concept of a submersible as ―a 
rowboat that would consist of a wooden skeleton covered by an oiled leather skin.‖  
While the Dutchman Cornelis Drebbel is considered the builder of the first ―submersible 
craft‖ in 1620, it was the American David Bushnell who produced a one-man 
submersible in 1775. Bushnell‘s Turtle could ―propel itself on the surface of the water. It 
could sink at will, operate and flourish underwater, and return to the surface when the 
operator wishes.‖1  Bushnell‘s invention inspired Robert Fulton, better known as the 
inventor of the steamboat, to design the Nautilus, a submarine that could ―ballast with 
underwater hand cranks.‖2  All of these early crafts were fundamentally surface vessels 
with limited submerged operational capability, but which were necessary first steps to the 
evolution of today‘s submarines and SPSSs. 
                                                 
1 Thomas Parrish, ―The Submarine: A History‖ (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2004), 11.  
2 Ibid., 9–13.  
 2 
While their early inventors conceived of the SPSSs as a military craft, in the 
twenty-first century, they have been employed in a non-military, but none-the-less lethal, 
task. Better known by its more popular name of ―narco-sub,‖ or ―drug smuggling 
submarine,‖ the SPSS has become a challenge to law enforcement and military officials 
tasked with interdicting drug shipments out of Colombia.  Since the 1990s, DTOs have 
diversified from the traditional ―go-fasts,‖ cargo ships, planes and fishing vessels, to 
include the utilization of SPSSs, which today have the capability of carrying up to 10–12 
tons of cocaine on a successful commute from Colombia to the shores of Mexico and 
Central America.     
In recent years, Colombia has been the center of cocaine production. However, 
during the 1980s, Peru‘s Upper Huallaga Valley was home to ―indisputably Latin 
America‘s strongest narco-terrorist alliance,‖ that united coca growers, drug cartels and 
terrorist groups.  The insurgent group Sendero Luminoso ―had penetrated the Upper 
Huallaga region of Peru, forging a monopoly of alliances with cocoa growers, cocaine-
paste manufacturing centers,‖ wrote investigator Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano in 1990.  
―More cocoa is grown in the Upper Huallaga region than anywhere else in the world.  
The two groups working together—Sendero Luminoso and the cocaine syndicate—have 
given rise to a powerful new phenomenon in Peru: narco-terrorism.‖ The Sendero had 
developed an effective relationship with drug traffickers, ―working in collusion with 
Colombian cocaine mafias,‖3 which in turn fed the expansion of the Medellin cartel 





                                                 
3 Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, The Washington Papers:  Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism.  
(Washington, DC: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 122.  
 3 
Colombian drug lords begin with poor Andean farmers to cultivate cocoa, which 
is then redefined and purified in jungle laboratories.4  At one time, ―Peru was home to 
over 120,000 hectares (300, 000 acres) of coca, producing 100,000-120,000 tons of leaf.  
However, in the late 1990s, according to DEA estimates, coca cultivation in Peru dropped 
from 214,800 hectares (530,000 acres) in 1995 to just 37,700 (93,000 acres) in 1999.  The 
decline in Peru‘s production sparked a rise in Colombia‘s coca cultivation to an estimated 
122,500 hectares of coca, which resulted in an output of 520 tons of cocaine.‖  Over the 
years cocaine production in Colombia increased substantially, because supply had to 
connect with demand and the drug cartels had to develop logistics and transit operations 
for cocaine leaving Colombia for the U.S. market via Mexico and the Caribbean.  
Having drug vessels and planes that can move cocaine undetected is the ultimate 
goal for Colombian DTOs.  Drug cartels have resorted to extreme measures, such as 
working with the Russians to build SPSSs.  For example, in September 2000, the 
Colombian National Police (CNP) found a partially built SPSS in a warehouse in 
Facatativa, just outside of Bogotá.  
CNP showed up, took a look, did a double-take, and then pronounced that 
this big metal ‗thing‘ was in fact a submarine. Not only was this a 
submarine but the plans were in Russian, a concrete indication of 
collaboration between Colombian DTOs and Russian mafias. But also, it 
offered an indication of the increasing reach and capacity of the 
Colombian cartels.5 
The DEA concluded: All available information suggests the submarine—if 
completed—could have been used to transport up to 10 metric tons of 
illicit drugs from Colombia to remote off-load sites in Latin America and 
the Caribbean.6   
                                                 
4 Grace Livingstone, Inside Colombia:  Drugs, Democracy and War; Foreword by Jenny Pearce, Rutgers 
University Press, New Brunswick: NJ, 2003, 104. 
5 Dominic Streatfield, Cocaine: An unauthorized biography (New York, NY: Thomas Dunne Books, St.Martin‘s 
Press) 2001, 415,419, 461, 473. 
6 DEA Intelligence Division, ―The Drug Trade in Colombia: A Threat Assessment South America/Caribbean‖ 
Strategic Intelligence Unit (NIBC) of the Office of International Intelligence (2002), 1. 
 4 
This shows that Colombian DTOs are currently dominating the production and 
distribution of cocaine and taking advantage of new technologies to strengthen and adapt 
their delivery systems.  
SPSSs are stealthy and able to carry drug shipments unnoticed throughout the 
region.  According to U.S. Southern Commander General Douglas Fraser:  
Just how stealthy they are was demonstrated when the U.S. military towed 
a captured semi-submersible behind a ship to test whether it could be seen 
during an exercise that depicted a fictional threat to the Panama Canal.  
And we had a pinpoint position of where it was, had a helicopter who 
knew exactly where it was, fly over the top of it and they couldn't see it.7   
Additionally the DEA concludes that,  
This incident again demonstrates traffickers‘ resources and ingenuity.  
Colombian cocaine trafficking groups generate billions of dollars in 
revenues each year, resources that increasingly have been used to purchase 
the best talent and technology available on the world market.8 
Colombian drug cartel operations for transiting cocaine are similar to military 
tactics, conducting covert strategies and actions to complete the mission.  It demonstrates 
the perseverance and commitment of DTOs to invest millions of dollars of engineering, 
construction and planning into an SPSS.  But even if one fails, other SPSSs are in line to 
try.  Furthermore, the SPSS is simply one of several distribution and transportation 
systems available to the DTOs, some of which are quite ingenious. For example, drug 
smugglers have used ―thinly sliced sheets of cocaine made to look just like Pringles 
potato chips.‖9 But none are more original or innovative than cocaine being delivered by 
a vessel that floats just below the surface of the water.   
                                                 
7 Inside Defense, ―Canal Zone‖,   August 18, 2010, 
http://insidedefense.com.libproxy.nps.edu/201008182049001/Inside-Defense-Blog/Defense-Next/canal-zone/menu-id-
73.html, August 18, 2010 (accessed October 5, 2010), 1. 
8 Ibid.  
9 Jeni Mitchell, ―Cocaine Submarines: The Next ―Miracle on the Hudson?‖ June 11, 2009, 
http://crimeconflictnexus.wordpress.com/2009/06/11/cocaine-submarines (accessed October 5, 2009), 1.  
 5 
 ―U.S. officials estimate that more than a third of the cocaine smuggled into the 
United States from Colombia travels in semi-submersibles.‖10 It is becoming more 
difficult to identify and track these SPSSs because of technological advances and DTOs 
determination to get through.  Recently, DTOs have developed remote-controlled model 
semi-submersibles: ―That means no crew. That means just cocaine, or whatever, inside 
the boat, said Michael Braun, a former chief of operations at the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration.‖11  
During my tour at Joint Interagency Task Force South as Tactical Action Officer 
(TAO) in Key West, FL, the process of detection and monitoring SPSSs was assisted by 
other federal agencies in the apprehension and capturing process as well.  Former director 
of JIATF South U.S. Coast Guard Rear Adm. Joseph Nimmich stood on a dock at the 
task force‘s headquarters in Key West, Fla., beside a vessel dubbed Big Foot II and said: 
These vessels are intelligently designed. They are not very comfortable, 
but they are now very seaworthy. They are capable of carrying multi-ton 
cargos. They can travel thousands of miles without refuel or resupply. And 
they are very hard to detect. Captured last year 350 miles off the 
Guatemalan-Mexican coast, the sub had a four-man Colombian crew and 




Figure 1.   SPSS diagram ―Bigfoot‖ II (Image available from Covert Shores Naval 
Warfare Blog: Open Source Intelligence) 
                                                 
10 Mitchell, ―Cocaine Submarines,‖ 1.  
11Jeni Mitchell, ―Cocaine Submarines: The Next ―Miracle on the Hudson?‖ June 11, 2009, 1. 
12 Ibid.  
 6 
The worst-case scenario U.S. officials‘ fear is terrorists using these vessels to 
conduct an attack in U.S. territorial waters.  The U.S. Coast Guard has contributed a great 
deal to the interdiction and suppression of SPSSs transiting through the Pacific Ocean 
and the Caribbean.  The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for maritime drug 
interdiction in the transit zone, responsible for the apprehension of cocaine transporting 
vessels and smugglers in the transit area—while still maintaining law enforcement 
detection and monitoring functions as well.13 
The U.S. Coast Guard continues to provide legal and logistical assets for reducing 
the threat of SPSSs shipping cocaine.  It allows U.S. Coast Guards members to board 
U.S. Naval vessels and act as legal liaisons known as ―law enforcement detaching teams 
(LEDETS) onboard U.S. and allied naval ships acting as a force multiplier in the transit 
zone.‖14 The U.S. Coast Guard is able to operate and carry out duties and procedures as 
law enforcement officers to intercept SPSSs.  In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard conducts 
searches on board fishing vessels as well as looking for contraband and evidence of SPSS 
association.  It is routine for fishing vessels to operate in vicinity of SPSSs, acting as a 
replenishment station for fuel and supplies.  In the past, the main targets for shipping 
cocaine were go-fasts boats and airplanes, which were being interdicted and suppress at a 
steady rate that forced DTOs to develop a more effective mode of transport. 
This thesis will offer an account of the evolution of the SPSS as a means to 
transport cargos of cocaine from Colombia to, Central America, Mexico and the United 
States, the efforts of the Colombia and U.S. governments and the international 
community to interdict them, as well as future challenges posed by new SPSS 
technologies.  
                                                 
13 Department Homeland Security, ―Testimony of Rear Admiral Vincent Atkins, U.S. Coast Guard, before the 
House Subcommittee on Homeland Security, on Department of Homeland Security Air and Marine Operations and 
Investments.‖ April 19, 2010, Washington, D.C. 
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1271690315007.shtm (accessed March 21, 2010). 
14 Ibid.  
 7 
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DRUG CARTELS 
In the late 1970s, Colombian drug cartels operated in small groups controlling the 
production and distribution of cocaine.  Soon these groups formalized and became known 
by the late 1970s as the Medellin cartel headed by Pablo Escobar and the Cali cartel led 
by the Ochoa brothers.15  The Medellin cartel developed the cocaine market in the United 
States and Colombia in the 1980s.  Escobar‘s December 1993 death left the Cali cartel, 
which had cooperated with authorities to eliminate their Medellin rival, in control of 
Colombia‘s lucrative cocaine market.  Organized according to U.S. researchers Decker 
and Chapman as   ―a loose association of five major drug syndicates, each representing 
aspects of the business,‖ the Cali cartel‘s demise came in the summer of 1995 when six 
of its bosses were arrested, two of whom were extradited to Miami and convicted, which 
caused the cartel to split into smaller entities.16  The Norte del Valle cartel is a splinter 
group of the Cali cartel.  It rose to prominence by seizing the routes and networks 
following the arrest of Cali drug cartel leaders Miguel and Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela 
in 1995.‖17   By taking trafficking practices from the Cali cartel ―playbook,‖  the Norte 
del Valle shortly became one of the biggest trafficking cartels in the region,  
responsible for between 30 to 60 percent of the cocaine that enters the 
United States.  Since 1998, the Norte Valle cartel has smuggled in excess 
of 500,000 kilograms of cocaine into the United States, with a wholesale 
value exceeding $5–10 billion.18 
However, these system of divided cartels remained, and these groups maintained 
a high concentration of drug trafficking, which allowed the North Coast cartel to emerge 
                                                 
15 Scott H. Decker and Margaret Townsend Chapman, ―Drug Smugglers on Drug Smuggling:  Lesson from the 
Inside (Philadelphia: PA Temple University Press, 2008), 34.  
16 Ibid., 34–35.  
17 Office of Foreign Assets Control US Dept of Treasury, ―Impact Report: Economic Sanctions against 
Colombian Drug Cartels, Department of Treasury March 1, 2007, 12, 
www.treasury.gov/resource.../sanctions/.../narco_impact_report_05042007.pdf (accessed January 12, 2010).  
18Lauren A. Dellinger, ―From dollars to pesos:  A comparison of the US and Colombian Anti-Monet Laundering 
Initiatives from an International Perspective,‖ May 21, 2008, 419, http://www.cwsl.edu/content/journals/Dellinger.pdf 
(accessed January 12, 2010). 
 8 
on the scene. Operating along the Northern border of Colombia the North Coast cartel 
controlled the maritime shipping routes of former Medellin and Cali cartels.19   
The North Coast cartels organized the maritime routes as exclusive transit zones 
for cocaine, allowing no one to penetrate and enter their territory without paying a fee.   
Although smaller and more de-centralized than both the Cali and North 
del Valle drug cartels, the North Coast cartel have more autonomous 
networks of independent maritime drug traffickers, such as Julio Cesar 
Nasser David, which are both highly profitable and powerful.20  
 
Figure 2.   DTO Colombian construction sites for SPSSs (Images available from Joint 
Interagency Task Force South, Self Propelled Semi-Submersible: SPSS fact sheet) 
                                                 
19 Office of Foreign Assets Control US Dept of Treasury, ―Impact Report: Economic Sanctions against 
Colombian Drug Cartels,‖ Department of Treasury, March 1, 2007, 95.  
20 Office of Foreign Assets Control US Dept of Treasury, ―Impact Report: Economic Sanctions against 
Colombian Drug Cartels,‖ Department of Treasury, March 1, 2007, 95. 
 9 
DTOs occupy remote areas, mainly on Colombia‘s remote Pacific coast, to 
manufacture SPSSs.  With some construction yards located in the Buenaventura jungles 
of Colombia, which have high-tech logistics to move equipments and materials from 
other cities via river boats.  An SPSS usually requires between 30–45 days of frame 
construction.  These sites must constantly change to avoid detection and ―some larger 
yards are capable of constructing up to three to four simultaneously,‖21 which allows 
Colombian DTOs to place 65 SPSSs at sea every year.22   
C. THE DECISION OF FARC TO JOIN THE DRUG TRADE 
The FARC began to profit from the trade in illegal drugs in the 1980s, which 
allowed them to grow their organization from a few thousand to an estimated 18-20,000 
fighter by 1998 and buy more sophisticated arms.   
They did so mainly by taxing peasant growers in their zones of influence 
and by contracting out their services to the trafficker organizations to 
protect crops, processing laboratories and landing strips.23   
The tradeoff for the FARC of becoming drug traffickers was that they sacrificed 
their ideological cohesion.  Initially, they taxed the peasant producers in areas that they 
controlled, and left the processing of coca into cocaine and transport to the cartels. Now 
however, according to Evan Covington, an author and member of the Harvard Model 
Congress Europe, the FARC is known to be involved with all areas of the drug trade 
including cultivation, production, and distribution.24   
Despite the fact FARC has substantially declined to about 9000 fighters, with at 
least some of its key leadership killed or captured, the guerrilla movement remains active, 
                                                 
21 Strategy Page, ―Colombia: Blood and Gold,‖ February 20, 2011,  
http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/colombi/articles/20110220.aspx (accessed February 24, 2011).  
22 Marc Van Riper, ―Background on narco subs.‖  October 5, 2008, 
http://narcosphere.narconews.com/notebook/marc-van-riper/2008/10/background-narco-subs (accessed September 14, 
2010). 
23 Bruce Michael Bagley, Drug Trafficking Political Violence and US Policy in Colombia in the 1990s.  School 
of International Studies University of Miami, 2001, 10.  
24 Evan Covington, ―Group of Fifteen: Drug Trade and Use in the Developing World.‖  Harvard Model Congress 
Europe 2010, 5. http://www.hmceurope.org/2010/docs/updates/G15_drugs_update.pdf (accessed December 12, 2010) 
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both as an insurgency and as a drug syndicate.25  For example, in 2007, the U.S. Navy 
said that two SPSSs found in a clandestine shipyard in the swamps around Colombia's 
largest port Buenaventura were connected to the FARC.26  Since the FARC had control 
of the land, it allowed DTOs to do what they wanted and provided resources to 
coordinate the development and production of SPSSs.   
According to the DEA director, Jay Bergman, FARC has already begun using Al-
Qaeda members in West Africa in order to deliver drugs to Europe.  Three members of 
Al-Qaeda have been arrested in West Africa and were extradited to the U.S. in 
December.27  The FARC is also coordinating with Chinese gangs in the tri-border area of 
Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil.28  These gangs could potentially provide services for 
Colombian DTOs as well.   These facts not only show that the FARC are involved with 
DTOs in transporting cocaine with SPSSs, but also that they have established 
relationships with terrorists organizations across the Atlantic Ocean.  
D. THE EMERGENCE OF PARAMILITARIES 
Paramilitary groups that emerged in the early 1990s financed themselves through 
illegal drugs. Although officially dissolved between 2003 and 2006, many simply 
reformed into what are called Bandas Criminales Emergents (BACRIMs).29  Others, 
however, are still active and using the same terror tactics by taxing the drug trade in the 
areas they control.  These paramilitary groups have a role in the development and 
protection of SPSSs, including monitoring and detecting law enforcement, which – it is 
widely assumed – is bought off to look the other way.   
                                                 
25 Vanda Felbab-Brown ―Coca and Insecurity in Nariño, Colombia,‖ Colombia, Crime, Latin America.  Fellow, 
Foreign Policy, 21st Century Defense Initiative.  The Brookings Institution).  
26 Associated Press. ―Colombia detains two homemade submarines ready to ship drugs,‖ October 31, 2007, 
http://english.pravda.ru/news/world/31-10-2007/99954-submarines_drugs-0 (accessed February 20, 2010. 
27 Adrian Al Sema, ―FARC and Al Qaeda in ―unholy‖ drug alliance,‖ January 4, 2010, 
http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/7529-farc-and-al-qaeda-in-unholy-drug-alliance.html (accessed 
December 14, 2010). 
28 Ryan Mauro, ―FARC Cashes in on Mexican Drug War,‖ June 8, 2010, 
http://frontpagemag.com/2010/06/08/farc-cashes-in-on-mexican-drug-war/ (accessed December 14, 2010). 
29 Dilshika Jayamaha, Scott Brady, Ben Fitzgerald and Jason Fritz, ―Lesson Learned from US Government Law 
Enforcement in International Operations.‖, PKSOI Paper, December 1, 2010, 
46,.http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil (accessed January 12, 2011). 
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The demobilization of paramilitary groups between 2003 and 2006 meant that the 
FARC and paramilitaries stopped fighting and began to cooperate. The BACRIM is the 
new organized threat in Colombia made up of diffuse networks of ―well-armed gangs 
(that) have experience and links with drug cartels and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC).‖30   The BACRIM in reality represents a new phase in the evolution 
of para-militarism in Colombia—just as the Bloque Metropolitano of the Águilas Negras 
in Bogotá expressed in flyers circulated in May 2010: ―We are not emerging bands. We 
are the Black Eagles and we are present as an army for the restoration of society.‖31 
The BACRIM continue to create a demand for light armaments, at the same time 
utilizing the AUC‘s old weapons collection to fund their criminal organization.32  These 
cartels and organized criminals are part of the problem that drives the drug smuggling 
world of SPSSs, whether it is internal or external, mobilized or demobilized. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
SPSSs are a security threat to Colombia and the region.  This thesis explains how 
SPSSs have plagued the United States with the drug trade from Colombia, and illustrates 
how the use of SPSSs has grown over time, introducing historical data that explains the 
origin, mission and sustainability of SPSSs.  Chapter II demonstrates the effects of the 
U.S.–Colombia reaction to fight the war on drugs with Plan Colombia and through 
fumigation, the Air Bridge Denial Program, and efforts to track and apprehend so called 
―go-fasts‖—drug carrying speed boats. The success of these programs sparked the 
evolution of SPSSs.  Chapter III examines the maritime interdiction countermeasures to 
suppress SPSSs.  Chapter IV discusses the future developments of SPSSs into fully 
submersibles (SPFS) and the development of remote-controlled narco torpedo shells.  
                                                 
30 Dilshika Jayamaha, Scott Brady, Ben Fitzgerald and Jason Fritz, ―Lesson Learned from US Government Law 
Enforcement in International Operations, 47. 
31 Jasmin Hristov, Legalizing the Illegal: ―Paramilitarism in Colombia‘s ‗Post-Paramilitary‘ Era.‖  NACLA 
Report on the Americas 2009, 19.  
32 Nicolas Urrutia, Miguel Ortega, Gustavo Andrade and Ann Vranckx.  ―Perspectives on Control, Traffic and the 
use of Illegal Weapons in Colombia,‖ Fundacion Ideas Para La Paz, Bogotá:Colombia,  November 2009, 5.  
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Finally, the thesis concludes with the argument that WMDs are the cargo of the future for 
SPSSs and SPFSs establishing a serious threat to national security.        
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II. COLOMBIA–U.S. REACTION TO DRUG TRADE 
A. FUMIGATION AND CUTTING LOGISTICS 
The GOC and USG continue to fight the war on drugs through fumigation.  
Eradicating, or at least significantly diminishing coca production in South America was 
the U.S. State Department‘s primary objective.   
However, from mid-FY1996 through sometime in FY1997, the United 
States cut off certain categories of assistance, including foreign military 
financing, which had been a large part of U.S. assistance to Colombia. The 
cutoff was mandated by President Clinton‘s decision to ―decertify‖ 
Colombian March 1996 and March 1997, in the annual evaluation as to 
whether drug-producing and transit countries are fully cooperating with 
the United States on counternarcotics efforts.33 
The USG implemented and provided services and programs that were instituted to 
eradicate the ―illicit crops called ―Plan Colombia,‖ an intervention system used inside the 
boundaries of the two major global wars of our time: the war on drugs and the war on 
terror.‖34  
The GOC organized eradicators to eliminate the coca cultivation,  
deciding on a program of forced manual eradication.  They formed various 
groups of uniformed eradicators who came with the army and police force 
to destroy the coca.35   
With the assistance of the Colombian government, coca production was halted in 
the valleys of Colombia‘s major coca-growing regions.  Colombian troops began to 
fumigate illicit narcotics crops in the region of Putumayo.36    
                                                 
33 Nina M. Serafino, Colombia: Summary and Tables on U.S. Assistance, FY1989-FY2003, CRS Report for 
Congress, May 3, 2002 ,http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/3603.pdf (accessed December 12, 
2010), 2. 
34 Margarita Rosa Serje De Le Ossa, Ashley Caja, Rebecca Natolini, Laura Moll Rexach, ―Iron Maiden 
Landscapes: The Geopolitics of Colombia‘s Territorial Conquest.‖  The Johns Hopkins University Press, Project Muse, 
South Central Review 24 (2007), 42. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Garry M. Leech, Death Falls from the Sky, April 23, 2001. http:/ /wwwcolombiareport.org/colombia60htm.  
April 23, 2001 (accessed June 23, 2010). 
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In November 2005, fumigation efforts ceased for fifteen days, until the 
Government of Colombia, merely decided to use aerial fumigation.37  This decision 
was not intended as an attack on tenant farmers,38 ―but rather in response to the death of 
six eradicators due to a landmine that had been placed underneath a coca plant by 
guerrillas.‖39 The decision to pursue fumigation sought to diminish coca production by 
fifty percent over a six year period.40   
The GOC understood the impact it could face if counternarcotics expectations 
were not met in a timely fashion.  
Between 2000 and 2005, Washington paid out nearly $4 billion to 
Colombia, with approximately 75 percent of the total going to the military 
and the police, and increased its presence in the country with 800 soldiers 
and 600 security contractors.  Indeed, Colombia is now the fifth largest 
recipient of U.S. military aid.41   
The GOC had no other choice but to cooperate with the USG in the eradication 
and fumigation efforts.  If not, funding and other state and local programs may have been 
in jeopardy.   
Nearly half of the Colombia funding was dedicated to the ―Push into 
Southern Colombia‖ program to set up and train two new Colombian 
Army Counternarcotics Battalions (CACBs).42   
Billions were spent to eradicate coca cultivation in Colombia and reduce the 
threat of terrorism.   ―Plan Colombia‖ eventually improved stability in the region and 
produce positive results.  
 
                                                 
37  Margarita Rosa Serje De Le Ossa, Ashley Caja, Rebecca Natolini, Laura Moll Rexach, ―Iron Maiden 
Landscapes: The Geopolitics of Colombia‘s Territorial Conquest , 42. 
38 Ibid., 42.  
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 43. 
42 Nina M. Serafino, Colombia: Summary and Tables on U.S. Assistance, FY1989-FY2003, CRS Report for 
Congress, 2. 
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B. COLOMBIAN AIR BRIDGE DENIAL PROGRAM 
 
 
Figure 3.   Air Bridge Denial image: Suspicious tracks detected over Colombia became 
concentrated along its borders (From: United States Government Accountability 
Office [GAO]) 
The drug war for the USG and GOC does not take a break—not even on 
Christmas day—specifically for JIATF South personnel who maintain a 24-7, 365-day 
operation, fighting drug traffickers with intelligence flow, communications, logistics and 
the Air Bridge Denial Program (ABD program), along with Air Bridge Denial Officers 
(ABDOs) from the U.S. and Colombian military.  
The ABD program‘s stated goal is to assist Colombia in suppressing the 
air traffic of illegal drugs—primarily cocaine—in its airspace by forcing 
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suspicious aircraft to land safely, so that law enforcement authorities can 
take control of the aircraft, arrest suspects, and seize drugs.43  
The ABD program has proven its effectiveness against drug traffickers who seek 
to transport illegal drugs via air routes in Colombia.  This program allows ABDOs to 
monitor thousands of flights to determine whether they are illicit or legitimate.  In 
addition,  
the program was expanded in 2007 to include surveillance of Colombia‘s 
coastal waters to strengthen the Colombian government‘s capacity to 
address the emerging threat posed by semi-submersible vessels.44   
Providing the Colombian military information regarding suspected air tracks 
allows other Colombian assets to search the same area, from a surface standpoint.  In the 
same year,  
the ABD program was expanded to include a maritime patrol mission. 
While conducting a maritime patrol, ABD aircraft assisted in the sinking 
of two self-propelled semi-submersibles, which resulted in the arrest of 
seven individuals and the seizure or destruction of approximately 11 
metric tons of cocaine.45   
Any aircraft not identified with a legitimate flight plan is labeled an air track of 
interest, ―Aircrafts suspected of involvement in drug trafficking are usually first 
identified by re-locatable over-the-horizon radar.‖ 46   If aircraft are deviating from their 
original flight plan they are monitored and targeted as a suspect track.  
Ultimately, flights that continue to transit illegally will be shot down and 
destroyed, which serves as a warning for others to avoid entering the Colombian 
                                                 
43 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Drug Control: ―Air Bridge Denial Program in 
Colombia has implemented new safeguards, but its effect on drug trafficking is not clear.‖ September 2005: 1, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05970.pdf (accessed February 8,  2010) 
44 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but 
Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Highlights of GAO-09-71, a report to the Detailed Plans for 
Reducing Assistance, October 2008: 36, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0971.pdf (accessed February 8,  2010). 
45 Ibid., 37.  
46 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Drug Control: ―Air Bridge Denial Program in 
Colombia has implemented new safeguards, but its effect on drug trafficking is not clear.‖ September 2005, 2.  
 17 
airspace.47 This is why drug traffickers think twice even before going into the airspace of 
Colombia. The likelihood of losing your life and not making good on your drug shipment 
is not the best scenario. 
In Figure 3, the Air Bridge Denial program air picture depicts the air traffic that is 
sorted hourly to ensure proper transition of all flights originating and departing in 
Colombian Airspace.  The program also confronted a number of DTO initiatives to 
protect illegal operations.  These issues include: 
 Many of the drug carrying aircraft had falsified registration/tail 
numbers that could be changed in minutes. 
  
 DTO aircraft carried extra fuel containers and improvised in-flight 
refueling systems including pumps that increased the aircrafts‘ 
range.  
 
 DTOs took action to ensure they were informed when ABD 
program aircraft took off.  It was not unusual to see illegal aircraft 
change course shortly after takeoff of an ABD tracker aircraft. 
Operations security became a key aspect of daily operations.  
 
 During night operations from illegal runways, DTO personnel 
would sometimes light large bonfires in a vain attempt to degrade 
night vision device effectiveness.48 
 
It is important that all data and intelligence is closely monitored and sorted, in 
order to identify a suspect track or air track of interest.  Effectively monitoring and 
detecting these illicit air tracks places the USG/GOC in a strong position to capture an 
SPSS.  When these air tracks are targeted, they may be associated with cocaine-carrying 





                                                 
47 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Step 14 on the ABD checklist gives permission to 
fire and destroy suspect aircraft when not responding. 
48 Ezequiel Parrilla, Air Bridge Denial: An International and Interagency Success Story. 
www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/.../2010_03_07_parrilla_eng.pdf, 4 (accessed July 16, 2010). 
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officials on average, since the implementation and development of the ABD Program, 
reduction in suspicious air tracks indicates that Colombia is deterring traffickers and 
regaining control of its airspace.49    
C. TACTICS TO COUNTER GO-FAST BOATS 
Before SPSSs, the primary vessels for trafficking cocaine were the dependable 
and speedy go-fast boats that dominated the waters of the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific 
Ocean.  DTOs launching go-fast boats were the norm; even transiting to the Bahamas and 
Miami were routine trips for Colombian drug traffickers.  While living in Puerto Rico 
and stationed at the Tactical Support Center (TSC), I had firsthand experience and 
knowledge of counter-drug operations and tactics.  TSC structured their goals and 
mission on detection and monitoring, gathering intelligence, which provided U.S. Navy 
and Coast Guard assets to interdict go-fast boats, airplanes and other vessels transiting 
drugs and weapons.  At the time,  
the flow of narcotics was accomplished through collaborative efforts 
between the squadrons, the Joint Interagency Task Force East (JIATF 
East) and the Tactical Support Center (TSC) located within the Atlantic 
Fleet Weapons Training Facility (AFWTF).50 
Chasing go-fast boats was the main objective of law enforcement officers and the 
U.S. military before DTOs developed and improved their technology and converted to 
SPSSs.  A go-fast boat operates at high speed—typically between 40–60kts—and has 
three or four outboard engines with enough fuel to traffic drugs from South America to 
Mexico and the Caribbean. ―Onboard these crafts are two or three drug smugglers, illegal 
drugs worth millions of dollars and gasoline‖51  Go-fasts boats began to dominant the 
scene in the 1980s, continuing strong up until the late 1990s,52 ―Transporting drugs from 
                                                 
49 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Drug Control: ―Air Bridge Denial Program in 
Colombia,‖ September 2005,  4.   
50 Global Security Org.  Tactical Support Center, Roosevelt Roads. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/tsc-rr.htm, 1, (accessed 12 June 2010).  
51 Kit and Carolyn Bonner, ―Always ready:  Today‘s US Coast Guard.‖ (St. Paul, MN: MBI Publishing Co.), 
2004, 109-110. 
52 Scott H. Decker and Margaret Townsend Chapman, ―Drug Smugglers on Drug Smuggling:  Lesson from the 
Inside (Philadelphia: PA Temple University Press, 2008), 69. 
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the Bahamas or Cuba in high powered go-fast boats—usually modified cigarette boats 
with two or three engines that held approximately four hundred kilos.‖53  These 
Colombian go-fast boats began to flourish as well, transiting cocaine to Puerto Rico and 
Florida: 
When traveling by speedboats, the loads were brought in at night to the 
Florida Keys or to a house in South Florida.  The night drop was better 
because law enforcement was suspicious of speedboats, and there was less 
intense law enforcement on the water at night.  One smuggler used three 
boats to bring in the load: one with the load, one to provide support if the 
loaded boat broke down, and a third with no drugs on board that acted as a 
decoy.54  
Law enforcement and the U.S. military became concerned over the emerging 
threat of go-fast boats transiting drugs, subsequently having to increase U.S. Coast Guard 
assets and Navy airplanes in the vicinity of those historical go-fast areas and routes.  In 
1997,  
according to Joint Interagency Task Force East, the most maritime drug-
smuggling modes of transportation involved go-fast boats and fishing 
vessels in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.55   
At the time, USG and GOC efforts in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean were only 
foiling a small portion of go-fast missions.  According to the DEA, the most popular 
routes originated in Colombia and Venezuela, which eventually transferred to the Eastern 
Caribbean throughout Central America, with direct shipments to the U.S. or Puerto 
Rico.56  The Caribbean experienced the most heavy go-fast traffic, because of the short 
time and distant it took to reach Haiti, Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico.  In addition, 
 
 
                                                 
53 Scott H. Decker and Margaret Townsend Chapman, ―Drug Smugglers on Drug Smuggling:  Lesson from the 
Inside, 69. 
54 Ibid., 70-71.  
55 GAO, Drug Control: Update on US interdiction efforts in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.  United States 
General Accounting Office, Washington D.C., October, 1997, 8, http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98030.pdf 
(accessed March 14, 2010). 
56 GAO, Drug Control: Update on US interdiction efforts in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.  United States 
General Accounting Office, Washington D.C., October, 1997, 6. 
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smaller loads made it feasible for smugglers to distribute a shipment once it hit shore, 
while the ―larger quantities of cocaine pass through Mexico via the Eastern Pacific and 
Western Caribbean corridors.‖57   
In 1998, less than 10 percent of go-fast boats were being interdicted and captured.  
This led Admiral James Loy, Former Commandant, to develop a plan to counter the go-
fast threat.  However, in 1999, the U.S. Coast Guard developed more problems with 
highly complex DPBs (high speed RIBs) that had substandard performance with 
interdiction and apprehension efforts of go-fast boats shipping cocaine.58 
 
Figure 4.   Go-fast boat transiting cocaine; subsequently boarded by U.S. Coast Guard 
and CBP (Image available from Smuggler and Pirate Go-fast Boat, 
http://www.london-research-and-development.com/GOFAST.pdf)  
The Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron (HITRON) eventually initiated and 
led a crusade of operating tactics and strategies, and implemented the Commandant‘s 
                                                 
57 GAO, Drug Control: Update on US interdiction efforts in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.  United States 
General Accounting Office, 6. 
58 Gary Russell, ―Is It Time to Designate Coast Guard Special Operations Forces?‖ U.S. Army Command and 
General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2005, 12, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA443195 (accessed March 14, 2010). 
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decision to stop the drug-laden go-fasts.59  The U.S. military and law enforcement began 
working constantly with partnering nations, developing staging areas for military and law 
assets to counter the threat of go-fast boats.  The USG and GOC utilized more aircrafts, 
specifically the P-3 Orion, which carried the necessary radar and equipment to track go-
fast boats on the water.  With the increase of U.S. Coast Guard and Navy surface units to  
counter cocaine shipments of go-fast boats from the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean, the 
most successful implementation of HITRON was the authorization to employ Airborne 
Use of Force or (AUF).   
These aircraft employ the latest radar and Forward Looking Infrared Radar 
(FLIR) sensors as well as state of the art Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) to 
pierce the night. HITRON arms these helicopters with M-16 5.56mm rifles 
and M240 7.62mm machine guns for warning shots and self-protection, 
and the RC50 laser-sighted .50 caliber precision rifle to disable the 
engines of non-compliant suspect vessels.60   
While the go-fast boat is disabled, surface units operating in the same area of 
responsibility (AOR), are vectored in to apprehend drug smugglers.   
                                                 
59 Craig Neubecker, Coast Guard Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron., U.S. Coast Guard Aviation History 
(HITRON-Jacksonville) February 23, 2010, http://www.uscg.mil/history/webaircraft/AC_HITRON_History.asp 
(accessed 23 July 2010). 
60 Neubecker, Coast Guard Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron, February 23, 2010, 1. 
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Figure 5. Go-fast boat with U.S. Coast Guard HITRON in pursuit (Image 
available from Smuggler and Pirate Go-fast Boat, 
http://www.london-research-and-development.com/gofast.pdf) 
HITRON was a success in countering daily operations of go-fast boats transiting 
the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.  The U.S. military increase its productivity of 
Maritime Patrol Aircraft‘s (MPA) and U.S. Navy surface ships, along with partnering 
nations, contributed greatly in reducing the threat of go-fast boats.    
HITRON will take up a firing position alongside the go-fast and fire 
warning shots across their bow to further compel them to stop.  If the 
warning shots do not convince the suspects to stop, the helicopter crew 
prepares to disable the vessel by shooting out the go-fast's engines.  Using 
precision, laser-sighted .50 caliber rifles, the helicopter crew positions 
themselves alongside the fleeing go-fast for disabling shots.  Once 
stopped, the vessel will be boarded by the Coast Guard pursuit boat crew 
and the smugglers taken into custody.61 
                                                 
61 Neubecker, Coast Guard Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron, February 23, 2010, 1. 
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These actions eventually compel DTOs to reinforce their shipments of cocaine 
with submerged covertness.  Because,  
Up until recent times the preferred mode of transport was go fast boats 
capable of carrying up to two tons of cocaine and making speed in excess 
of fifty knots.  These vessels would run from Colombia to Honduras, 
Guatemala, Belize or Mexico where the drugs would be handed off to 
continue on its way by land or air into the U.S.62  
DTOs developing the SPSS seem to be the only option that could overcome the 
GOC and U.S. Military strategy of interdiction and disruption in transiting cocaine.  More 
production of SPSSs prove to be effective an well-organized for DTOs, only a few SPSSs 
have been caught in the departing harbors, because according to Air Force General 
Douglas Fraser  ―In the mangrove swamps in Western Colombia you can be ten feet 
away from where somebody‘s building a semi-submersible and never see it.‖63 
D. INSPECTION OF SHIPS: PORT AND HARBORS 
The U.S. Coast Guard has the resources and manpower to ensure the threat of 
SPSSs can be deterred and eliminated from U.S. ports and Colombia.  The U.S. Coast 
Guard has the technology and capabilities to operate around the world and provide 
training and assistance.  The U.S. Coast Guard has established strict procedures and 
inspections of ships in harbors and ports that can reduce the threat of SPSSs obtaining 
position and launching.   
Having a high velocity of harbor traffic in Colombia does not make it easy, 
because:  
About 20 national and international shipping lines operate in the 
Caribbean harbors (Barranquilla, Cartagena, Santa Marta, Turbo, Puerto 
                                                 
62 John Borland, ―The Implications of Globalization on Maritime Security in the Wider Caribbean and Central 
America.‖  SIRC-Nippon Fellows Maritime Conference at the Seafarers International Research Center, Cardiff 
University, November 2008, 4.   
63 Defense Tech, SOUTHCOM Battles Drug Cartel Submarine Armada.  April 28, 2010.   
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Bolívar) and the Pacific harbors (Buenaventura, Tumaco). The harbors 
dispose of many piers and extensive storing capacity.64   
It is hundred of ships entering and departing these locations everyday, which 
makes it difficult to detect SPSSs.  Since goods are shipped from as far as Europe and 
Miami, with Barranquilla being the most important harbor, DTOs have the opportunity to 
outfit not only container ships and fishing vessels with contraband, but load large 
amounts of cocaine bales into SPSSs and launch them straight into the  Pacific and 
Caribbean oceans unnoticed.65   
These cocaine shipments, hidden in ships and bound for Mexico, Central America 
and U.S., are interdicted by Colombian and U.S. Coast Guardsmen who actively 
coordinate with law enforcement organizations. These organizations are the difference 
makers in making sure cocaine laden SPSS vessels are not leaving the port and harbor 
areas of Colombia.  For example, according to the U.S. Embassy Bogotá, Colombia, in 
2007, the efforts of interagency allowed the Coast Guard to make its largest maritime 
cocaine seizure in history.  The Coast Guard intercepted the Panamanian flagged motor 
vessel Gatun just outside the coastal waterways of Panama and Colombia, carrying more 
than 33,500 pounds of cocaine—or approximately 20 tons.66  The Colombian military 
works diligently with the U.S. Coast Guard inspecting ships and cargo, strengthening 
their partnership and countering drug smugglers in ports.   
 
The tactical combined efforts of international maritime have included:    
1. Conducted over 1,500 security boarding‘s on high interest vessels 
bound for the United States. 
2. Interdicted nearly 5,000 undocumented migrants attempting to 
illegally enter the U.S. 
3. Conducted over 70,000 commercial inspections of U.S flagged 
vessels. 
                                                 
64 Pymes, Exportadoras De Colombia, Transport, 1, 
http://www.usergioarboleda.edu.co/PyMES/english/transport.htm Universidad Sergio Arboleda, 2003 (accessed June 
23, 2010).  
65 Ibid.  
66 Colombia Press Release, ―Successful Interagency Maritime Interdiction Forces Smugglers to Extreme Tactics.‖ 
http://bogota.usembassy.gov/pr_63_17122007.html (accessed August 20, 2010).  
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4. Conducted over 12,000 Port State Control safety and 
environmental examinations on foreign vessels entering U.S. 
ports.67 
 
The Coast Guard‘s ―ability to conduct distinct but interrelated maritime 
functions—law enforcement, national defense, environmental protection, 
transportation, safety, and humanitarian response—defines its unique multi-
mission character and value.‖68  Having a positive international relationship 
brings cohesiveness and productivity with partnering nations.  This relationship 
with other nations has expanded and became a major deterrent for cocaine 
trafficking, which impacts DTOs investment and launching of go-fasts boats and 
SPSSs.  Today, the same agenda has evolved in relation to drug interdiction, 
international and national port authorities that have coordinated guidelines and 
procedures between each other to prevent DTOs from smuggling and launching 
SPSSs.  For example,  
The U.S. Coast Guard has been a key participant and the primary U.S. 
representative to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for all 
policy developments since the IMO Convention entered into force 50 
years ago.69   
Directly overseeing operations in overseas ports and maintains harbor security 
and stability in foreign countries.  International port authorities and the U.S. Coast Guard 
are involved in joint efforts that continue to contribute to thorough inspections and drug 






                                                 
67 Dept. Homeland Security, ―Budget-in-Brief.‖ www.dhs.gov (accessed February 18, 2011).  
68 USCG, US Coast Guard Fiscal Year 2009 Performance Report.  
http://www.uscg.mil/history/allen/docs/USCG_FY09_Performance_Report.pdf (accessed December 12, 2010). 
69 U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, USCG IMO.  http://www.uscg.mil/imo/ (accessed May 4, 2010). 
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E. DTOS TURN TO SPSS EVOLUTION IN 1990 
1.  Proliferation of Mission  
 
 
Figure 6. SPSS diagram of its internal structure and instruments (Image available 
from Covert Shores Naval Warfare Blog: Open Source Intelligence) 
Some of the characteristics of SPSSs are as follows: 
 SPSS: a surface vessel of 40 to 80 feet in length with very 
low freeboard (exposed height above water line) of typically 
18 inches. Presently used for drug smuggling.  
 Material: made out of Fiberglass/wood making it difficult to 
be detected at sea visually due to very low freeboard and 
also by Radar.  
 Propulsion: self-propelled by single or twin diesel engines 
with fuel storing capacity of not less than 1500 gallons.  
 Control and Communication: Manual or Remote controlled 
uses Global Positioning System (GPS), compact and 
powerful communication equipment. 
 Capacity: can accommodate up to four persons and can 
carry cargo (cocaine) of 4 to 12 metric tons depending on 








 Future developments: as SPSS has proved to be very reliable 
for smuggling since 1990s,  now steel is also used for 
construction of SPSS to make it more  stronger to improve 
seaworthiness and bigger to increase cargo carrying 
capacity.70 
 
The task of deterring a terrorist attack via SPSSs echoes what the former Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense under the Bush Administration, Richard Douglas called a 
―three zones‖ strategy to disrupt the cocaine trade to the United States and Europe:  
first, the source zone where the narcotics are produced; second, the transit 
zones the areas of the world where these things transit on their way from 
the source to, third, the arrival zone.71 
According to Captain Robert Watts, a United States Coast Guard officer who has 
tracked maritime drug smuggling trends, SPSSs are a fairly recent technology dating 
from 1989: 
The Colombian drug trade has evolved into one of the most brutal and 
lucrative businesses in the world.  Many countries are suffering the 
consequences of cocaine SPSSs which are clearly proliferating and are on 
the path to become a major conveyance for maritime drug traffickers in 
Colombia.72  
Early vessels were primitive, unstable boats with diminutive ranges, rather 
like David Bushnell‘s 1775 Turtle.  Longer range boats have not become 
practical until global position system (GPS) technology was made 
available for civilian use by President William Clinton in 1996, and after 
U.S. and Colombian authorities began to experience success in 
intercepting go-fast speedboats typically used by the smugglers.73  
In the 1990s, airplanes and go-fasts were used to transit cocaine from Colombia to 
Mexico, the Caribbean islands and Central America.   
                                                 
70 Marine Tech. ―Torpedo Shells to Replace Self Propelled Semi Submersibles for Cocaine Smuggling,‖ May 14, 
2009.  
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The use of these drug submarines started being explored by some of 
Colombia's top drug runners in the mid-1990s, according to the Christian 
Science Monitor.  The so-called go-fast boats that tried to outrun U.S. 
Coast Guard patrols were being caught.  The go-fasts had replaced cocaine 
laden planes when they became too easy to detect.74   
However, as shipments of cocaine were repeatedly seized by law enforcement, 
Colombian DTOs began to invest in the technology of SPSSs, which opened new 
smuggling avenues.   
Because of concentrated SPSS searches from the CNP in the late 1990s, drug 
cartels were compelled to change their methods and construction sites.75  The growing 
threat of SPSSs not only impacts the poor and disadvantaged, but affects the working 
class and elites as well, because ―drug cartels have many military and law enforcement 
entities from Mexico, Central, and South America on the payroll.‖76  To remain 
successful in SPSS operations, DTOs receive information from law enforcement, 
government and foreign officials that have faced threats of violence and intimidation, 
―This makes joint cooperation to catch submarine threats a difficult task due to lack of 
trust among U.S. and foreign entities.‖77   
For example, DTOs and foreigners are engaged in international cocaine 
operations that have ignited and pose a serious threat to national security.  Evidence of 
this behavior was demonstrated when an incomplete semi-submersible was found in 
Colombia in 2000, it showed DTOs are using Russian plans to engineer an SPSS.  For 
example,  
Stalisnar A. Osipov, an intelligence officer at the Russian Embassy in 
Bogotá said the submarine could not have been built without Russian 
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technology.  This Russian connection speaks volumes about the likelihood 
that Russian criminal organizations were somehow involved.78   
These SPSSs were certainly engineered and designed by well-educated and 
knowledgeable people.  However, there is only one known contributor that has assisted 
with the craftsmanship of these SPSSs, the ingenious Enrique Portocarrero,  
Law officers here have dubbed him ―Captain Nemo,‖ after the dark genius 
of 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea, the 45-year-old has designed and built 
as many as 20 fiberglass submarines, strange vessels with the look of sea 
creatures, for drug traffickers to haul cocaine from this area of Southern 
Colombia to Central America and Mexico.79   
According to Colombian Navy Captain Luis German Borrero, Portocarrero 
introduced innovations such as a bow that produced very little wake, a conning tower that 
rises only a foot above the water and a valve system that enables the crew to scuttle the 
sub (intentionally sink) in 10 minutes.80  
Nevertheless, having political and criminal international ties give DTOs an 
advantage over local law enforcement and the military.  The partial SPSS found in 
Colombia had North Korean characteristics resembling the Sang-O class submarines.  
Sparking debate as to whether the North Koreans could possibly be involved.  However, 
according to Dr. Spalding, ―the North Koreans can‘t take the credit for the design of their 
SPSS.  They borrowed it from the Russians who had been using them for years.‖81   
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More recently, others have issued allegations and assumption regarding North 
Korea‘s connection with SPSSs, including South Korea‘s Foreign Minister Yu Myung-
hwan, who believes North Korea, was involved in the sinking of their naval ship in 
2010.82  According to the Dong-a llbo newspaper,  
an 85-ton North Korean submersible is believed to have torpedoed the 
vessel.  Citing an unidentified government official, the report said the 
conclusion was based on intelligence on the movement of North Korean 
submersibles and analyses of intercepted North Korean military 
communication.83   
Given its international attention and association with Russian and Korean 
militaries, Colombia and the United States should acknowledge that the threat of SPSSs 
is a national security concern.  It is just a matter of time before the technology of these 
semi-submersibles will become advanced enough to penetrate the Gulf of Mexico or 
California coasts and enter U.S. shores, causing damage to the infrastructure or perhaps 
physically harming citizens.   
Colombian naval officials must develop a pre-planned response to not only deal 
with this threat, but to implement programs to track DTO affiliations outside of 
Colombia. This would provide the military and law enforcement the necessary tools to 
suppress DTOs.  It is vital for the security and stability of not only Colombia, but the 
Western Hemisphere as a whole.   
In addition, the capabilities of these semi-submersibles are advancing at an 
alarming rate, considering the SPSS that was found in Colombia in 2000 had a dive depth 
of 325ft (99m) and capable of carrying 10–15 tons of cocaine.84  The GOC should 
assume that the limitations and capabilities of these semi-submersibles have dramatically 
grown over time.  These SPSSs are now outfitted with GPS and infrared digital camera 
equipment providing drug traffickers extended mobility and allowing ―SPSS vessels to 
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navigate independently without need for external communication.‖85  In order to 
maintain a stealthy travel the SPSS ―fuel tanks are filled with seawater as they empty; 
they maintain a steady, ultra-low profile that makes them nearly impossible to spot by 
eye at any distance over one nautical mile.‖86  
2.  SPSS Transport Routes 
 
 
Figure 7. SPSS transit routes of the Eastern Pacific Ocean and Western Caribbean 
(Image available from Spiegel Online International, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/bild-732292-157394.html) 
SPSSs have a high success rate of trafficking cocaine in the Pacific and Caribbean 
areas, known as primary transit zones, because of the improved technology and 
upgrading.  The engineering modifications allowed SPSSs to become more efficient and 
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full proof over the water.  SPSSs transit cocaine undetected and covertly supply‘s cocaine 
to other drug cartels in the region. These SPSSs have shown to be extremely difficult to 
track, identify and detect, because:  
The structure of an SPSS is purposely shaped to minimize the vessel‘s 
wake, while exhaust pipes are designed to minimize its thermal 
signature.87   
The upgrades conducted on SPSSs are just a small part of the overall 
enhancement process for cocaine operations.  DTOs have developed SPSS launch sites 
into covert units.  For example, SPSS locations and departures are undisclosed and 
considered high value targets areas; neither U.S. military or Colombian naval officials 
know the whereabouts of these clandestine construction sites.   
The tactical logistics of SPSSs depend on secrecy, ―In fact, drug-trafficking 
organizations practice exceptional control of information regarding SPSS launch date, 
cargo, route, and destination.‖88 Transiting at high tempo in the littoral routes of the 
Pacific, where tons of cocaine could be vulnerable to law enforcement interdiction.   
SPSSs are considered ―invisible cargo‖ until intelligence has been received on 
their underway launch times and dates.  The apprehension process of semi-submersibles 
must continue to integrate law enforcement methods that can prevent these vessels from 
leaving the Colombian coast.  DEA intelligence gatherers also must be able to ―position 
themselves into jungle hideouts where semi-submersibles are built, because once 
underway, there is a lot of ocean to scour.‖89  
DEA agents usually experience the ―catch 22,‖ because law enforcement efforts 
are made to crack down on cocaine distribution in México, which in turn, forces 
Colombian DTOs to use Central America as a major transshipment point for cocaine 
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bound for the United States.90  DTOs will switch cocaine shipments, because it has 
realized that other avenues of cocaine distribution can be easily targeted when law 
enforcement increase containment tactics.  The Mexican drug cartels and Central 
American gang‘s networks of violence expand when semi-submersibles are successful in 
delivery operations, because these drug cartels and gangs generate most of the logistics 
for cocaine entering Mexico and the Southern Border of the United States.  
The ―SPSS balloon effect‖ has impacted Mexican and Colombian societies, 
because some fishermen have been threatened into this enterprise of drug trafficking, 
while others have been convinced that this is the only way to make a reasonable living.  
These so-called ―drug trafficker fishers‖ are risking their lives in transporting cocaine in 
SPSSs, which has risen to new levels because of the economic incentive it pays.  There 
are no gray areas; drug trafficking organizations maximize all options to traffic drugs. At 
the same time, transiting drugs across the Pacific and Caribbean using an SPSS provides 
a larger storage capacity of cocaine, which will increase their productivity and 
distribution level.  DTOs are pleased with the development and method of SPSSs, 
compared to the traditional over-the-water logistics of go-fasts boats, which had a 
considerable amount of losses over the years. 
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III. U.S. TACTICS TO COUNTER SPSS 
A. SPSS LEGISLATION 
Despite the success of SPSS cocaine trafficking, undercover DEA agents have 
managed to penetrate their operations posing as crew.  Once an SPSS has been detected 
and engaged by law enforcement, drug smugglers usually scuttle to obliterate evidence 
and thus be rescued as shipwrecked sailors by, 91 law enforcement and the military with 
man-overboard and rescue-at-sea operations. 
It is obvious that DTOs incur a huge loss from scuttling SPSSs; however,  
with the drugs disposed of, law enforcement personnel lacked evidence of 
criminal wrongdoing under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act 
(MDLEA).  The U.S. military and Law enforcement are forced to treat the 
situation as a mere castaway rescue mission, picking up the occupants 
from the ocean and returning them to their home country.92 
Drug traffickers began to catch on to these methods of scuttling an SPSS without 
suffering any legal action from law enforcement.  The Coast Guard became aware of the 
problem and introduced a bill—the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act of 2008 
(DTVIA)—in Congress to allow prosecutors to bring criminal charges even when the 
cargo is not recovered taken by drug traffickers.   
The DTVIA is definitely a big step forward for the DEA and CBP, specifically 
allowing law enforcement to take legal action against anyone operating an SPSS. ―If that 
happens, the crews will be prosecuted and encouraged to disclose information about how 
SPSSs are trying to penetrate U.S. maritime surveillance.‖93   
Though, according to P. Federico Bower, the attorney for Carlos Andres Mina 
Meneses, one of the Colombians indicted in the September 2008 SPSS case, no evidence 
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should mean no conviction: ―the law is based on assumptions and the government is 
assuming it is a drug vessel.  All we know is my clients was on a vessel that sank.  No 
drugs found.‖94   
Despite the new law, some drug-smuggling crews still take the chance to transit 
cocaine across the region.  It happens more now, because  
Some SPSSs have the fuel capacity and supplies to travel 3,000 miles 
without replenishing, that's the distance from Los Angeles to New York.  
That's a huge area to cover with limited resources.95   
However, having an inadequate number of resources to detect and monitor SPSSs 
puts law enforcement and the U.S. military at a disadvantage to accomplish the mission 
of interdiction and apprehension effectively.  Law enforcements efforts are built on 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions to track, identify, and interdict 
these SPSSs.  If resources are lacking, then a course of action must be taken to resolve 
the problem.96 
B. MARITIME INTERDICTION PROGRAMS 
While go-fast boats have reduced the activity of cocaine shipments in the transit 
zone, they are still considered a primary vessel in drug trafficking, only second to the 
SPSS in transporting cocaine.  However, the SPSS continues to maintain this mysterious 
profile, because no one witnesses these semi-submersibles being developed and 
integrated into drug operations in their early stages.  When an SPSS is launched and  
traveling in the transit zone, it may be vulnerable. Yet, ―by using cocaine as ballast, these 
craft can literally sneak under the radar to their destinations, where they are then 
unloaded and abandoned.‖97   
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The GOC and USG must implement policies and procedures that deter and 
suppress SPSSs, such as installing state-of-the-art equipment on all aircraft and surface 
ships.  SPSSs have made exceptional advances in their physical structure making it 
difficult for them to be detected.  SPSSs have now reduced their transit time on station 
and continue to have anonymous coordination with other vessels to evade law 
enforcement and the U.S. military.  In other words, policies are needed to: 
counter these new methods, enhanced capabilities are required for wide-
area surveillance to support the detection, identification, tracking, and 
interdiction of target vessels beyond 12 nautical miles from the U.S. 
coastline.
98
   
First and foremost, to reduce the threat in such a huge area, Colombia and the 
U.S. military must have more and more assets.  In order to make SPSSs incapable of 
completing their missions, a strong presence is needed in the transit zone, with intense 
surveillance in key departing locations, such as Buenaventura and Tumaco.  The strategy 
in countering SPSSs begins with intense asset integration and developing a wide 
surveillance structure to target SPSS vessels.  SPSSs are extremely difficult to locate 
during the day, because they are covered with a blue tarp totally hidden from maritime 
patrol aircraft and surface vessels.  Sometimes only traveling at night, the SPSS produce 
very little wake in the ocean and are assisted by decoy fishing vessels during it transit.  
Since this is the case, U.S. tactics must start from the ground level, in which DHS 
describes how countering SPSSs can stop an emerging threat: 
 The DHS counternarcotics community must engage in cooperative 
efforts specifically designed to disrupt and dismantle Drug 
Trafficking Organizations (DTOs).   
 
 The DHS counternarcotics community will address drug 
trafficking at the state, local, and tribal levels, as well as at the 
national and international levels. We must understand the 
significant challenges and critical interests of our partners and 
build on strengths while minimizing weaknesses.   
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 Our counternarcotics efforts must be directed at identifying, 





SPSS countermeasures must focus on the historical and geographical routes of 
drug trafficking, analyzing all data and sources of cocaine organizations.  The mission 
must branch over to other venues—not just the maritime domain and transit zones of the 
Eastern Pacific and Caribbean, but viable land base targets and penetrating DTO 
networks from the inside.
100
  Programs such as ―Plan Colombia‖ and the ―Drug Flow 
Attack Strategy‖ are effective and making progress as well.  CBP developed and 
implemented an initiative focusing on joint U.S.–Colombia narcotics interdiction efforts.   
As part of U.S. support to Plan Colombia, CBP provided Colombia with 
training and assistance on personnel management systems to assure 
coordinated operations on border interdiction and industry partnership 
programs.
101
   
The USG and GOC are conducting day-to-day operations, 24–7 detecting, 
monitoring and interdicting SPSSs from DTOs.  These programs of interdiction have 
improved, which has frustrated DTOs.  In order to stay one step ahead of law 
enforcement, DTOs are forced to change and develop new tactics daily.  But once those 
tactics are known, changes are quickly integrated into the USG/GOC countermeasure 
transit routes.  DTOs have gone as far as implementing new crew changes for SPSS 
transits, just to foil law enforcement interrogation tactics.  By changing out the crew 
members, provides a disconnect with any tracking efforts that are associated with future 
cocaine operations.   
The Drug Flow Attack Strategy focuses on departure areas that make it difficult 
for DTOs to launch SPSSs; however, since some DTOs have the protection and 
coordination of some corrupt law enforcement officials, it is easier for them to assemble 
and depart undetected.  The primary objective of the Drug Flow Attack Strategy is to 
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cause major disruption to the flow of drugs and money, between the source zones and the 
United States.  By establishing an effective and efficient interagency process, it deters the 
threat in transit zones, making DTOs less likely to launch on specific dates.  SPSSs and 
cocaine interdiction threat assessment determines the most efficient use of interagency 
resources that can possibly disrupt SPSSs operating in source and transit zones.
102
   
The USG and GOC have implemented counterdrug programs to eliminate the 
flow of drugs throughout Colombia.   
They combined forces and put into practice host programs and expanded 
its joint intelligence gathering efforts with Colombian agencies since 
2008.  The objectives of these intelligence gathering programs include 
information related to new groups emerging from the demobilization 
process of paramilitary organizations, intelligence on methamphetamine 
production and transportation in Colombia, information related to 
Colombia/Venezuela cross-border drug trafficking activity, and a final 
intelligence program which targeted the Colombian ports and the 
transportation organizations using the ports.
103
   
Moreover, the USG and GOC tactics and programs to counter SPSSs and 
suppress drug trafficking in geographic locations and departure zones include:   
 The Enlace Program established in the Southern Cone countries of 
South America more than five years ago to exchange law 
enforcement officers with the South American countries. The 
program has supported investigations and initiatives which have 
benefited both the DEA mission and missions of the host 
nations.
104
   
 
 Operation Panama Express, a joint operation designed to disrupt 
and dismantle major maritime drug smuggling organizations 
operating from the Pacific and Caribbean coasts of Colombia.  The 
operation is conducted by DEA and several other federal, state, and 
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These programs are a success, specifically Operation Panama Express, especially 
when it demonstrated its effectiveness by assisting in the seizure of 20 tons of cocaine 
from the vessel Gatun.  According to Former commandant of the Coast Guard Adm. 
Thad Allen,  
This record-breaking seizure was the result of good actionable intelligence 
and the closest collaboration amongst our interagency partners through 
Operation Panama Express.106   
These programs produce the best results for military and civilians conducting counter 
narco-trafficking operations, at the same time, continue to provide difficulty for DTOs to 
develop and launch an SPSS in designated departures zones.     
The DEA and CBP offer both in-country and regional training programs 
conducted by mobile training teams as well.  In-country programs are seminars 
conducted in a host country and include participants from that country only.  For 
example,  
the Port of Entry Interdiction Training (PEIT), this general description 
encompasses four specific training courses concerning border security 
issues found at the various types of international border environments, i.e., 
land (IBIT), seaport (ISIT), rail (IRIT) and airport (IACIT).
107
   
The U.S. Coast Guard is the maritime security leader in law enforcement and 
continues to provide the best tactics for drug interdiction, developing a ―five year counter 
drug strategy called ―Steel Web.‖  This strategy is a comprehensive approach to counter 
maritime cocaine activity in the transit and arrival zones of SPSSs.  The cornerstones of 
this plan are as follows:  
 Maintain a strong interdiction presence to deny smugglers access 
to maritime routes and deter trafficking activity. 
   
 Strengthen ties with sources and transit zone nations to increase 
their willingness and ability to reduce the production and 
trafficking of illicit drugs within their sovereign boundaries, 
including territorial seas. 
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 Support interagency and international efforts to combat drug 
smuggling through increased cooperation and coordination.
108
   
C. NEW COUNTERMEASURE DEVELOPMENTS 
The threat of SPSSs has sparked counter tactics from the Naval Postgraduate 
School faculty-student Operational Research team, which developed a mathematical 
model that determines the best combination and deployment of search platforms to detect 
and classify self-propelled semi-submersible (SPSSs).  Commander, Daniel ―Barney‖ 
Pfeiff and Distinguished Professor Gerald Brown provides a detail analysis on how to 
tackle the problem of interdicting SPSSs.  According to Gerald Brown, ―Running 
scenarios for the Eastern Pacific and the Caribbean using five types of search platforms 
where the attacker has to choose a transit path and the defender has to determine the best 
use of search platforms to detect and classify SPSSs, we come up with a consistent 
optimal plan for defenders: use a mixed [probabilistic] strategy to shape the attackers‘ 
routes by positioning search assets to force the vessels into chokepoints where they are 
more easily spotted, identified and interdicted.‖109These countermeasures are informative 
and credible, which can be used in the present as well as future operations in detecting, 
tracking and identifying SPSSs.  Moreover, efforts to counter SPSSs are reaching out in 
the international community, the HMCS Montreal, recently ―became the first Canadian 
warship to conduct acoustic sensor trials with SPSS vessels.‖110  Having multinational 
units involved in stopping SPSSs, demonstrates the importance to prevent these vessel 
from threatening the region.   
If foreign military forces are honing in on these countermeasures, it only reveals 
the seriousness and complexity of this SPSS problem.  The U.S. tactics in countering 
SPSSs has evolved and aligned with another possible international force—Israel.  SPSSs 
can transit for days without fuel, draining the on-station time of military and civilian 
aircrafts fuel and manpower.   
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However, Israel is proposing to use ―Narco-Drones‖ to disrupt cocaine shipments 
of SPSSs.  The Narco-Drone will stay in the air longer than any other Maritime Patrol 
Aircraft assets.  The Narco-Drone ―Heron‖ is Israeli-made, though an expanded fleet 
would be tested and built in the U.S., subject to congressional approval.
111
  Drones could 
be the U.S. and GOC stealth hunters, tracking and detecting stealth smugglers from high 
above the ocean.  In addition, these drones could be used as surveillance tactics in DTO 
operations to ensure the safety of undercover DEA agents.  Nevertheless,  
U.S. Southern Command would use the Heron for surveillance only 
against the drug subs—which are extremely difficult to detect and 
interdict—seems like a no-brainer.   It would employ some of the same 
advantages that the subs have for traffickers such as endurance and 
stealth.
112
   
Finally, the U.S. may have the opportunity to implement the new technology of 
underwater surveillance in the Gulf of Mexico and the Eastern Pacific Ocean to intercept 
and capture SPSSs that are departing and entering coastal waterways.  For example,  
a group of researchers is working on developing a network of solar-
powered autonomous underwater vehicles (SAUVs) that will 
communicate with each other to detect threats and hazardous substances in 
coastal and harbor waters.  According to Arthur Sanderson, the SAUVs 
could be used to detect potential threats by detecting and tracking objects 
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IV. CONCLUSION: FUTURE TRENDS  
A. SPSS TRANSITIONAL TECHNOLOGY 
 
Figure 8. Narco-Torpedo shell used to transit cocaine into Mexico and Central 
America (Image available from Covert Shores Naval Warfare Blog: Open 
Source Intelligence) 
 The sophistication of these semi- submersibles are growing at an alarming rate, 
along with other developments, such as narco torpedo shells that are used as towing 
mechanisms filled with cocaine.  These torpedo shells can tow between 500kg and 
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transportation methods for torpedoes are sometimes used in conjunction 
with semi-submersibles.  The torpedo shells towed are not physically 
joined with SPSSs, but are attached to fishing vessels with a steel cable as 
long as 1,000 feet.115   
The logistics, however, seems more complicated than the SPSS, which require and has a 
technique of three boats working simultaneously to complete the smuggling operation.   
The whole process of using torpedo shells to traffic cocaine involves:  
One to tow the device, one to go ahead to warn of marine patrols or the 
U.S. Coast Guard, and one for backup protection—a lookout that travels 
24 hours behind the towboat.  It was practically a relay, and the chance of 
success was about 90 percent.116   
According to Dr. Montoya, the comparisons between semi-submersibles and 
torpedo shells is that SPSSs have a ―mold made of fiberglass, and carry a large diesel 
engine,‖117  while torpedo shells are able to stay beneath the water, and use a radio buoy 
that is able to float to the surface of the water camouflaged as a log.118  
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Figure 9. Narco-Torpedo shell captured by Colombian authorities in Buenaventura 
(Image available from Covert Shores Naval Warfare Blog:  Open Source 
Intelligence)    
The narco torpedo shell is totally hidden from law enforcement surveillance, as 
escorts and decoy towing vessels pretend to be occupied in fishing operations.119  The 
only way to interdict or capture the torpedo shell is to engage the towing vessels and 
prevent them from relaying or detaching the steel cable for other vessels to retrieve the 
hand-off.   The interdiction role would force vessels to slow down and cause the 
camouflaged radio-buoy to be exposed and immediately surface to the water.  Although 
the DTO success rate was highly effective, it consumed a great deal of manpower to carry 
out the evolution, because of the mission and the distance to travel and the whole process 
involving three vessels.  Initially, these torpedo shells devices were  
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made to travel to Mexico, but the final objective of the development of 
this technology was to transport the product from the ports of Colombia 
and the Caribbean, all the way to the coast of Spain.120   
This shows the determination of DTOs wanting to ensure the shipment of cocaine, 
will be able to meet the demand market by any means necessary. DTOs eventually want 
to make these torpedo shells ―completely automatic and operated by remote control—
they could be navigating it from their offices using satellites.‖121  However, compared to 
semi-submersible vessels involved in transiting cocaine are fewer, which allow a less 
congested relay and simplistic hand-off operation.  Although, SPSSs does have a slow 
speed of six to eight knots but,  
if you‘re looking at the horizon, semi-submersibles are impossible to 
see—that is one of vessel‘s advantages.  A disadvantage is that, in the day 
time from above, they are very easy to spot, because of their wake in the 
water, no matter how much they are camouflaged.122   
DTOs create an environment of unyielding opportunity, using money and assets at 
all costs to transit cocaine across the ocean into Mexico and Central America.  If DTOs 
are forced to use this much technology and innovation to escalate cocaine products and 
dissuade law enforcement, it is just a matter time before SPSSs and torpedo shells reach 
the United States territorial waters.   
In order to be effective and track these torpedo shell vessels and SPSSs, the GOC 
and the U.S. military must have a number of sufficient assets and resources on the water 
and in the air.  Otherwise, it is difficult to locate these vessels, because SPSSs have  
small visual infra-red and radar signatures making them difficult to detect 
by non-acoustic sensors.  Additionally, SPSS designers and DTOs have 
taken particular care to reduce infra-red signatures through the use of 
exhaust cooling systems.123  
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B. DEVELOPMENT OF FULLY SUBMERSIBLES (SPFS) 
The first ever fully operational Self-Propelled Fully-Submersible (SPFS) recently 
discovered in Ecuador demonstrates the ingenuity and extreme measures these DTOs are 
willing to take to get their cocaine product across the ocean.  The SPFS has the capability 
to go underwater to 50 feet; diving any deeper will risk the possibility of hull crush depth.   
According to Jay Bergman, DEA Andean Director,  
This is a game changer for us and will prompt an array of 
countermeasures….This has the national security community concerned as 
much as the drug interdiction community.124 
 
 
Figure 10. SPFS diagram that depicts the internal structure and instruments (Image 
available from Covert Shores Naval Warfare Blog:  Open Source Intelligence) 
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This innovation of DTOs creating the perfect SPSS has risen to a new level, 
which has evolved and appears to be developing in a manner that is faster than expected.  
It is intimidating watching these DTOs grow into such supreme traffickers of cocaine.  
Recently, the  
police in Ecuador, acting on intelligence gathered by the United States 
Drug Enforcement Administration, raided a secret jungle shipyard near the 
country‘s border with Colombia and discovered what American officials 
called ―a fully operational submarine built for the primary purpose of 
transporting multi-ton quantities of cocaine.125  
DTOs has also realized that detection and monitoring of these vessels are not 
going to stop, and law enforcement assets are going to continue scouring the oceans 
every day searching for SPSSs.   
Therefore, DTOs were forced to take the next step in evolution of SPSSs, because 
law enforcement continues to deliver the pressure of interdiction daily.  According to 
Rear Admiral Nimmich, ―It's in fact a logical progression; as we get better at interdiction, 
they move to try to counteract our success.‖126  The development of SPFSs is evidence 
that DTOs are planning to completely escape law enforcement detection and surveillance.  
The USG and GOC may have to shift focus and find new ways to prevent and eliminate 
these vessels from even getting a chance to enter the water.  DTOs feared the pressure of 
law enforcement being able to infiltrate construction platforms locations that could put a 
dent in their future cocaine operations.  The SPFS has a periscope and the capacity for a 
crew of five or six, rather than three or four on an SPSS, and the ability to fully 
submerge.  We can only imagine that, in time, these fully submersibles will continue to 
improve with technology and provide greater cause for concern.     
DTOs seek opportunity and innovation, and connecting with terrorists may be the 
next step after the newly developed SPFS.  It is evident that DTOs are evolving into 
another cycle of submersibles, because  
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Authorities are in no doubt that the smugglers will soon invent a new way 
to traffic cocaine.  But they may already have come up with the next 
step—a remote-controlled, fully operational submarine that can dive 
below the waves.127   
It has become apparent that DTOs are maximizing their efforts of efficiency by 
developing more complex and sophisticated submersibles.  These fully submersibles are 
completely hidden beneath the ocean and can carry anything unnoticed into the region, 
including WMDs.   
 
Figure 11. SPFS seized from drug traffickers in Timbiqui, southwestern Colombia 
(Image available from Times Tribune, http://thetimes-
tribune/polopoly_fs/1.1105229!/image/1486298576jp) 
In the past, chasing down high-speed go-fast boats was challenging, but not as 
scary as having to fathom WMDs could be on one of these SPFS vessels heading straight 
to the U.S.  The new generation of narco subs developers has scored a ―big one,‖ 
developing the capability to penetrate the region totally undetected.  The technology of 
SPSSs has taken a leap forward for DTOs, and it is just a matter time before they use the 
same innovative tactics to create indefinable tunnels that reach into the U.S.  In addition,  
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the increasingly successful use of submarine-like small vessels by drug 
smuggling organizations should raise the nation‘s anxiety concerning the 
possibility of a successful small boat attack in U.S. waters.128   
C. SPSS–SPFS CARRYING WMD?  
The primary function of Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles (SPSSs) is to transit 
cocaine from Colombia to Mexico and Central America.  While this is bad enough, the 
real fear of U.S. officials is that future SPSSs may become the delivery vehicle for 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), either biological or nuclear, in the event that 
DTOs collaborate with terrorists to carry out an attack in the Western Hemisphere, or that 
terrorists simply acquire SPSS technology on their own.  SPSSs may deliver the next 
Armageddon, because,  
any viable method to covertly transport large quantities of illicit drugs 
over long distances such as these [vessels] could conceivably be employed 
to transport other prohibited materials.129  
 The Gulf of Mexico, the Atlantic coast and the Pacific coast offer a range of 
vulnerable targets for terrorist attacks.  SPSSs also have the capability to smuggle human 
cargo, perhaps Al Qaeda or Taliban agents.  As SPSSs become more sophisticated, the 
potential to reach U.S. territorial waters grows.  Therefore, deterrence and detection will 
become a layered, multi-agency challenge, involving distant interdiction by Colombia, 
intermediate interception by U.S. and international navies, and potentially U.S. law 
enforcement agencies like the Department of Homeland Security and even local and state 
police.  
 The potential for a terrorist attack using SPSSs will require the development of 
new intelligence sources.  Because Colombian DTOs have extensive foreign networks 
and contacts, the possibility that they will be contacted by terrorists interested in SPSS 
technology is not improbable.  
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It would be naive to assume that what is good for international commerce 
and international communication is not also good for international 
terrorists, who are increasingly becoming opportunistic entrepreneurs 
whose ―product‖ (often quite consciously ―sold‖) is violence against 
innocent targets for a political end.  —Professor of Strategy, U.S. National 
War College Senior Associate Audrey Kurth Cronin.130   
 The counter-argument is that DTOs and terrorists will never join forces because 
their objectives are entirely different—DTOs seek to make money in the United States, 
not blow it up.  On the other hand, DTOs may cooperate unwittingly with terrorists, who 
may in any case acquire the SPSS technology on their own.  In December 2008, Admiral 
James Stavridis, USN, former commander of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), 
stated that the threat of WMD delivery via an SPSS ―is clearly the next big thing.‖   
Stavridis‘s special fear is that SPSSs are evolving into fully submersible boats that will 
pose an even greater threat because they will be impossible to detect.131  Were this to 
happen, the U.S. maritime domain may witness the next 9/11, with terrorists being able to 
utilize transit routes that were developed primarily for shipping cocaine via SPSSs. 
DTOs are counteracting law enforcement tactics by developing innovative 
techniques and looking for constructive ways to transfer cocaine and other contraband to 
markets around the world.132 
WMDs are the most extreme violence that could be generated from SPSSs 
transiting through the Western Hemisphere.  However, the insensate and barbarous acts 
of SPSSs are now being used on innocent women and children who are confined and 
forced into these vessels for human trafficking networks.  Hundreds of thousands are 
moved through the Latin American region every year, and are forced into prostitution.  
Unfortunately, many leaders both in the United States and in Colombia have failed to 
recognize human trafficking as part of a larger, more complex security threat.   
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These women and children are traveling through the Eastern Pacific Ocean 
destined for prostitution.  From a reality perspective, that human cargo could just as 
easily be narcotics, nuclear weapons, or Al-Qaeda and Taliban members.133  In other 
words, the same chances are regarded and considered for human trafficking when DTOs 
use SPSSs to transit cocaine.  DTOs are thinking it does not matter what goes into an 
SPSS as long as they benefit from a high-percentage profit. This potentially opens the 
door for other options, such as WMDs.  
The possibility of this happening worries the GOC and U.S. military, because 
tactics of this nature could be integrated into an SPSS and sent straight into the U.S. and 
Mexico.  What is the possibility of terrorists obtaining any chemical agent to destroy and 
kill hundreds of thousands of people in the Latin America region using an SPSS?  This 
could be a major problem down the road for GOC, because they have no control over 
DTOs.   
DTOs will seek to gain financial security from terrorists, producing SPSSs for 
monetary value.  Nevertheless, the possibility remains and the opportunity still exists for 
the terrorist to execute the perfect plan if they are able to transfer the technology to 
another venue, or simply have a SPSS built for them in a Colombian jungle shipyard. 
Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice states that, ―nations incapable of exercising 
responsible sovereignty have a spillover effect in the form of terrorism, weapons 
proliferation, and other dangers.‖134 
The SPSS threat may be influencing terrorists to become part of the Colombian 
cocaine network of organized crime.  DTOs association with any terrorist groups will 
eventually spark a problem that can cripple the Latin American region as well as the 
United States.   According to Rear Adm. Joseph Castillo, the Coast Guard‘s director of 
response policy, ―This is a serious threat which is growing, both in volume of cocaine 
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shipped, and in sophistication of the craft.‖135  The opportunity for DTOs to co-exist with 
other terrorists such as Al-Qaeda may be easier than expected.  Since Afghanistan 
terrorists are the drug traffickers of opium, it could be an attractive market for Colombian 
DTOs.  If these groups were to come together, it would give the GOC and USG a serious 
problem, because ―Colombia remains the world‘s largest supplier of cocaine, while 
Afghanistan is the top global opium producer.‖136 The cooperation between the groups 
lures the possibility of an SPSS maritime enterprise.  Al-Qaeda operatives planning to use 
these semi-submersibles can launch an attack straight into U.S. ports and harbors.  For 
example, the Port of Long Beach, on the West Coast of the U.S., has the 
most important source for crude oil shipments, having received more than 
30 million metric tons of petroleum products in 2005, is an attractive 
target for would-be terrorists.137   
The maritime domain and port security are key concerns for law enforcement and 
the U.S. military.  Terrorists would be able to take WMDs into one of the world‘s busiest 
ports, destroy the infrastructure, and cause an economic downfall throughout the region.  
The possibility of this happening is daunting and will change cruise liners and oil tankers 
usual way of doing business.  These ―SPSSs tactics and payloads could one day represent 
a great threat to the United States and our partners.‖138  The duty of the GOC and U.S. 
military is to recognize that an SPSS threat is evolving and take the necessary precautions 
to prevent an attack.  In addition, the GOC and the USG must have a vigilant approach to 
suppress and deter SPSSs.  If not, the productivity of SPSS cocaine shipments may cause 
a regional balloon effect and rise throughout the region, triggering an increase in violence 
and instability. 
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The GOC and USG law enforcement and military resources are continuing to 
prevent SPSSs from reaching Mexico and Central American coastlines.  However, their 
valiant work could force DTOs to choose new routes of trans-Atlantic shipments.  For 
example, West Africa and Europe cocaine shipments are among the countries, Colombia 
has delivered using airplanes and container ships.  In the future, the new primary arrival 
location for SPSSs may be Europe and West Africa port waterways and coastal areas.   
Drug Traffickers are always developing ways to prevent interference of their 
illegal activities.  As the U.S. modifies tactics to adjust to DTO efforts, drug producers 
and traffickers find innovative ways to maintain their cocaine operations as well as 
develop alternative trafficking routes to transport it.139  If DTOs perceive their shipments 
are no longer profitable, other cocaine shipment routes and locations will be considered 
in order to sustain the maximum outcome.  Without the cooperation and teamwork of 
both USG and GOC detection and monitoring teams, the interdiction and apprehension 
phase would not be possible.  This is especially important, because right now these 
criminal organizations are using SPSSs as a primary cocaine vessel, but this could soon 
change and into weapons of mass destruction.   
SPSSs cause instability and insecurity in the region, which in turn, allows 
Colombian DTOs to take advantage of weak states.  DTOs have the capability to unite 
with terrorists and sell SPSS technology, which could eventually be used to ship WMDs.  
If so, that is something that not only the U.S. wants to address, but other world leaders 
need to address as well.  Colombian DTOs have already developed a sophisticated, hard 
to detect SPSS, which are good indications that, association with terrorists and WMDs 
are not too far from the list.  These technological progressions could potentially attract 
terrorists‘ organizations that are interested in conducting attacks against other countries 
as well.  It may seem less likely for DTOs to get involved with terrorists, because that 
could potentially limit their demand market; however, DTOs are already decreasing the 
demand by destroying people lives with cocaine.  Having the definitive edge of making 
people give into drugs is what DTOs want in order to generate more cocaine sales.  
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SPSSs are transcending their technology across the globe into Africa and the 
United Kingdom.  It is already difficult for the GOC and USG to track and detect these 
submersibles in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, but now ―traffickers are increasingly 
transporting drugs from the Caribbean to West Africa by sea and then on into the 
UK.‖140   
The Colombian cocaine market to Mexico and Central America is the highest in 
transport activity of cocaine, but the overseas demand market across the Atlantic is 
becoming easier to transit and profit from as well.  In other words, there should not be a 
central focus for transiting cocaine, because it motivates DTOs to make advancements in 
technology and develop overseas routes, not yet known.  The GOC and USG should 
cover all methods and routes used to traffic cocaine.  Having law enforcement resources 
focusing on a certain area or region could also force DTOs to collaborate with terrorists.  
Europe and Africa are just as important as Mexico and Central America and needs the 
same attention, because ―The Navy says 20 to 30 tons of cocaine is shipped across the 
Atlantic Ocean each day.‖141   
Cocaine trafficking for Colombian DTOs now stretches across the Atlantic and 
into the Mediterranean Sea, allowing them to strengthen their foundation and association 
with known terrorists.  According to the Michele Leonhart,  
We see traffickers‘ adaptability with their continued exploitation of 
African routes, using countries there as a key command and control 
platform to move cocaine to Europe.142   
This demonstrates that DTOs are advancing in overseas trafficking, setting up 
labs with possible construction of SPSSs; WMDs will soon follow.  
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It is also common knowledge that once a relatively wealthy country such 
as South Africa becomes a major transit route, it is not long before it 
becomes a major drug consuming country‖143 
An opportunity will always remain for DTOs to conspire with terrorists and use 
SPSSs for WMDs.  It can be chemical or nuclear in nature, causing an international 
disaster in the Western Hemisphere.  The USG and GOC have to take into account the 
worst-case scenario when dealing with such innovative technology of DTOs. For 
example, President Barrack Obama believes  
The greatest threat to U.S. and global security is no longer a nuclear 
exchange between nations, but nuclear terrorism by violent extremists and 
nuclear proliferation to an increasing number of states.144   
This same idea applies to DTOs that may be coercing with terrorists, planning a 
WMD destruction attack using nuclear or biological weapons via SPSS.  According to 
James Carafano of the Heritage Foundation,  
The threat is pretty much global, Sri Lanka saw a lot of this and we have 
seen some from Hamas as well, so we know groups are borrowing tactics 
from one another.145   
It is not a far-fetched situation. DTOs are motivated by profits, and if these 
extremists were to offer a huge amount of money for the technology and development of 
SPSSs, a coastal or harbor attack can easily be carried out within a few years in the U.S.  
The creativity and expansion of these vessels will ignite drug cartels to improve the 
technology of another transiting tool for cocaine—underground tunnels.  In 2007, 
congress passed legislation providing a 20-year maximum sentence for the developing or 
financing of subterranean passages between the U.S. and another country.146  The threat 
                                                 
143 Simon Baynham, ―Narco-Trafficking in Africa: Security, Social and Economic Implications.‖ African 
Security Review. http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/asr/4No6/Editorial.html (accessed July 18, 2010).  
144  Robert Burns and Anne Flaherty, Obama Calls Nuke Terrorism the Top Threat to US.  April 6, 2010.  
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=10295550 (accessed April 30, 2010).  
145 Christopher J. Castelli, Navy Advisers Mull Small Vessel Threats After Classified Data Delay.  June 28, 
2010.  http://insidedefense.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Inside-the-Navy/Inside-the-Navy-06/28/2010/navy-advisers-mull-
small-vessel-threats-after-classified-data-delay/menu-id-150.html (accessed October 5, 2010).  
146 Donna Elm, ―Re: Submersible Vessels: Before the United States Sentencing Commission Public Hearing on 
Proposed Amendments for, March 17–18, 2009.  
 57 
of tunnels being used to transports human cargo and drugs concerned congress, because 
―these passages were directly on U.S. soil and could be used by terrorists‘ organizations 
to smuggle in dangerous weapons.‖147  The proceeding in passing laws against SPSSs, 
were based on the same philosophy and guidelines.  Drug smugglers operating and 
transiting SPSSs would be given a ―maximum 15-20 years sentence, since, theoretically, 
it can carry more dangerous cargo and present a threat to the security of the United 
States.‖148  
D. CONCLUSION 
When a second SPFS was discovered in Colombia, a Colombian Admiral 
Hernando Wills was not surprised:  
We actually have been forecasting for awhile that we'd find more of these.  
First came the semi-submersible, now the fully-submersibles...and next 
will be remote-controlled subs.149  
It would be naive to imagine that these are among the first of many SPFSs which 
are no doubt transiting the Pacific Ocean at this very hour, evading authorities and 
planning their next mission.   
These drug trafficking organizations are going to continue to ―raise the bar‖ in 
technology, as Admiral James Stavridis recognizes:   
We need to be able to rapidly detect and interdict this new type of threat, 
both for its current effects via the drug trade and more troublingly for its 
potential as a weapon in the hands of terrorists.150   
Having the combination of real time intelligence and multiple assets reduces SPSS-SPFS 
mobility and suppresses their coordination to engage in illicit activity with other surface 
vessels.   
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The U.S. military and law enforcement must continue to apply pressure on DTOs, 
which forces them continually to alter their delivery systems. More might be at stake if 
one imagines, as does Commander Pat Paterson a U.S. Navy Foreign Area Officer who 
has worked in Latin America since 1997 said that:  
In a time of proliferating weapons of mass destruction, the idea of 80 to 
100 enemy vessels steaming undetected toward the California or Florida 
coastline represents a major national security threat.151   
The SPSS and SPFS will continue to be a major threat affecting the internal and 
external boundaries of Colombia.  In order to effectively counter this activity, 
international cooperation must start at the local and state level, branching out to establish 
U.S. and foreign assistance.  The USG and GOC must continue to exchange information 
with other partnering nations to reduce the chance of SPSS technology falling into the 
hands of terrorists.  According to Rear Admiral Nimmich,  
The concern that most of us have is the relationship of illicit trafficking 
with any illegal activity or any potential terrorist wanting to take 
advantage of it.152  
This is going to take a global effort, not just from the U.S. military and GOC.  
However, in order to combat and stop DTOs from launching SPSSs and SPFSs in the 
Western Hemisphere, it must be a unified objective. The Colombian  
cocaine that is inbound to Mexico and Central America pass through a six-
million square mile transit zone, an area about twice the size of the 
continental United States, which includes the Eastern Pacific Ocean, Gulf 
of Mexico, and Caribbean Sea.153   
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The U.S. military and law enforcement have the responsibility to monitor and 
suppress illicit traffic operating in the transit zone area calling for a combined effort with 
Colombia and other partnering nations.   
Navy warships, flyover planes and military helicopters equipped with 
radar, video cameras, day-time and night-time surveillance equipment and 
both large and small military weapons are used in the detection and 
apprehension of Colombian fishing vessels, go-fast boats and submersible 
vessels.154 
All forces are operating in a joint environment with partnering nations, reducing 
the threat of drug trafficking violence in Colombia and, at the same time, countering the 
SPSS and SPFS threat.  It will continue to take international cooperation and advanced 
equipment to counter these submersibles.  The technology innovation achieved by DTOs 
has created a surreptitious vessel that has sparked major concerns for the USG and the 
GOC, considering it will cause a national security risk, and eventually be used to carry 
anything from terrorists to WMDs.  
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